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Do Pupils From Low-Income Families Get Low-Quality Teachers? Indirect 
Evidence from English Schools 
Gaps between the educational attainment of pupils from higher and lower income families are 
widespread and persistent. Teacher quality is amongst the most important school-based 
determinants of pupil attainment, making the allocation of teachers to pupils a potentially 
important reason for this attainment gap. We use a range of well-evidenced indicators of teacher 
quality from the School Workforce Census and the Teaching and Learning International Survey to 
investigate the extent of social inequalities in access to teacher quality in England. Looking at the 
allocation of teachers between schools, we find that disadvantaged pupils are more likely to have 
unqualified, inexperienced or out-of-subject teachers. We present evidence that this reflects both 
demand from early-career teachers to work in such schools and a greater supply of vacant 
positions in these schools, due to poor staff retention. We find some evidence of an inequitable 
allocation of teacher quality to classes within schools, though this is limited to our teacher 
experience indicator. This is in part due to teachers with more experience at a specific school being 
better able to influence their allocation to less disadvantaged classes. Implications for policy are 
discussed. 
Keywords: teachers; teacher allocation; attainment gaps; organisational capital 
Introduction 
The Persistence of Inequalities in Educational Attainment 
Inequalities in educational attainment by family background are found across the developed world 
(OECD, 2012). Across nations, the gaps are substantial, with disadvantaged pupils’ reading ability falling 
behind their most affluent peers by between one and three years of schooling by the end of secondary education 
(Jerrim, 2012).  These gaps are also persistent, remaining broadly stable across the OECD between 2000 and 2009 
(Jerrim, 2012). In England, the context for this study, the patterns are similar. At age 11, pupils entitled to free 
school meals (FSM) are around half as likely to achieve a Level 5 or above in English and Maths than their more 
affluent peers (Strand, 2014). At age 16, FSM pupils are again around half as likely to achieve five good GCSEs 
(between A* and C) including English and Maths (Lupton and Thompson, 2015). While the gap between FSM 
and Non-FSM pupils declined in the second half of the twentieth century (Blanden and MacMillan, 2014), the gap 
between the top and bottom income quintiles remained high and broadly stable over that period (Macmillan and 
Gregg, 2007). 
 These inequalities have persisted despite a range of policies aimed at narrowing the gap. In England, 
disadvantaged pupils attend less effective schools (Hobbs, 2016). The reasons for this are complicated, with family 
resources and support for education, school organisational structures and climate all playing a role (Thrupp and 
Lupton, 2006). A number of policies have therefore been implemented with the aim of improving disadvantaged 
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pupils’ access to better schools. The Assisted Places Scheme (1980), for example, provided subsidised private 
education for low-income, high-ability students. Later that decade, the Education Reform Act (1988) allowed 
pupils to express a preference for which school they attended. A number of policies have also tried to improve the 
schools which disadvantaged pupils attend. The introduction of Office for Standards in Education (Ofsted), 
collaborative programmes such as the London Challenge, and the increase in resources going in to schools serving 
disadvantaged intakes through the Pupil Premium are all examples of this approach. While these policies may have 
contributed to narrowing the gap however, they have failed to eliminate it. Moreover, progress seems to have 
slowed in recent years (Lupton and Thompson, 2015).  
One plausible explanation for this is that policy is not targeting the most important causes of the gap.  
Reviews of research consistently show that teacher quality is amongst the most powerful school-based 
determinants of pupil attainment (Burgess, 2015; Hanushek and Rivkin, 2012), with the effects of access to higher 
quality teachers detectible in adult earnings over a decade after leaving school (Chetty et al., 2014). Moreover, 
because high quality teachers have been shown to have a disproportionately large effect on the progress of 
disadvantaged pupils (Aaronson et al., 2007; Slater et al., 2012) this could also narrow gaps within classrooms. In 
short, while policies focusing on choice, accountability, collaboration and funding may contribute to closing the 
gap, they may be missing the point of greatest leverage: teacher allocation. 
Existing Literature on Teacher Allocations 
This raises the question of whether students from different social backgrounds do indeed have 
unequal exposure to high quality teachers. A number of studies in the US find that schools with more 
disadvantaged intakes generally have less qualified teaching staff (Clotfelter et al., 2007; Feng, 2010; 
OECD, 2014), including one study in the UK (Allen et al., 2017). Four studies, all from the US, go a 
step further by measuring the allocation of teacher quality based on pupil test score gains. Sass et al. 
(2010), Isenberg et al. (2013) and Mansfield (2015) find evidence of a small bias in the allocation of 
high quality teachers towards schools serving more advantaged pupils. Baird et al. (2016) find no 
overall inequalities in the allocation of teacher quality, though this varies in the different districts in 
their sample. 
Research looking at the allocation of teachers to classrooms within schools have a clearer set of results. 
Studies using a range of datasets, all from the US, have found that classes containing disadvantaged pupil are more 
likely to get inexperienced or less qualified teachers (Grissom et al., 2015; Kalogrides et al., 2012; Loeb et al., 
2012; Mansfield, 2015). Sass et al. (2010) look directly at the impact of individual teachers on pupils test score 
gains and find that higher quality teachers are assigned to classrooms with fewer disadvantaged pupils. Isenberg et 
al. (2013) and Mansfield (2015) replicate this finding but also point out that inequalities in allocation between 
schools are greater than within schools. 
In summary, the existing literature suggests that there are important inequalities in the allocation of 
teachers to pupils both between and within schools. However, findings vary greatly from one school district to 
another (Baird et al., 2016; Isenberg et al., 2013; Sass et al., 2010), suggesting that local institutional or labour 
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market differences may have an important impact. To our knowledge, the present study provides the first evidence 
from outside the US on social inequalities in access to teacher quality both between and within schools. 
 
Measuring Teacher Quality 
The US research described above generally uses data that allows teachers to be linked to the pupils 
they teach. Provided these teachers can be identified in multiple school settings, or (even better) be 
randomly allocated to classrooms, the contribution of individual teachers to pupil progress can be 
measured (McCaffrey et al., 2009; Kane et al., 2013). In the UK however, it is not possible observe 
which pupils are taught by which teachers using administrative data, making it hard to measure 
inequalities in access to effective teachers in the same way. For this reason, our approach is more akin 
to the studies by Clotfelter et al. (2007), Feng (2010), Grissom et al. (2015), Kalogrides et al. (2012) and Loeb et 
al. (2012) in that we look instead at observable indicators of teacher quality, rather than direct measures of teacher 
effectiveness. This section introduces the three indicators used and reviews the evidence for their association with 
pupil progress, emphasising where the results have been replicated in different datasets to demonstrate their 
robustness. 
The first indicator of teacher quality that has been linked with lower teacher value added is whether or not 
a teacher is fully qualified/licensed. Goldhaber and Brewer (2000) were amongst the first to report this finding 
using the 1988 National Educational Longitudinal Study. Two papers using data on North Carolina schools, and a 
number of different specifications, have found that teachers without a full license are less effective (Clotfelter et al., 
2006; Clotfelter et al., 2007). Kane et al (2008) and Boyd et al. (2008) use New York City data and also find that 
unlicensed teachers are less effective, though this result is not robust to all specifications in the former paper. The 
literature is not entirely consensual however, with Croninger et al (2007) finding no effect of certification status on 
attainment in their study of kindergarten children in the Early Childhood Longitudinal Study. This suggests that 
certification may be more important for secondary school teachers. We therefore analyse primary and secondary 
teachers separately in this paper.  
 The second indicator of teacher quality that we use is amount of experience on the job. The inferiority of 
newly qualified teachers has been replicated in a number of papers using data from Florida (Chingos and Peterson, 
2011), North Carolina (Henry et al., 2011; Clotfelter et al., 2007), New York (Boyd et al., 2008) as well as the 
Early Childhood Longitudinal Study (Croninger et al., 2007).  Until recently, the consensus was that the returns 
from experience trail off after around three years in the job. However, three recent papers using superior 
methodology have shown that the returns to experience actually continue much later into a teachers’ career, up to 
and beyond ten years in the classroom (Harris and Sass, 2011; Wiswall, 2013; Papay and Kraft, 2015). 
 The third indicator of teacher quality measures how much teachers in the school are working outside of 
the subject in which they have been trained. Wayne and Youngs (2003, p107) reviewed early work in this area and 
concluded that the research was inconclusive “except in mathematics, where high school students clearly learn 
more from teachers with certification in mathematics, degrees related to mathematics and coursework related to 
mathematics.” Since then a number of studies have replicated this finding using different datasets (Baumert et al., 
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2010; Hill et al., 2010; Kane et al., 2008). Harris and Sass (2011) fail to replicate these findings using data from 
Florida but, as the authors state, this may be due to the small sample size. Outside of mathematics, it is less clear 
that subject-specific training matters (Goe, 2007). We therefore provide separate results by maths/non-maths in this 
paper. These indicators allow us to study the allocation of teacher quality in English schools. 
 
The Allocation of Teacher Quality Between Schools 
Data and Method 
Data for our between-school analysis are taken from the School Workforce Census (SWC). This is a 
large administrative dataset which contains demographic, employment, absence, curriculum and 
qualification data on all teachers working in English state schools since 2010/11. At the time of 
writing, the most recent year for which data was available was 2014/15. The SWC includes a dummy 
variable indicating whether a teacher has qualified teacher status, which allows us to measure our first 
indicator of teacher quality. The SWC also contains the date when teachers first qualified, which we 
use to construct a measure of classroom experience. Unfortunately, we cannot observe whether 
teachers have taken a break from teaching and then returned to the classroom prior to 2010, making 
this an imperfect measure. Our third indicator can be observed in the SWC by looking at each 
timetabled hour in a subject and identify whether the teacher has an academic degree in the subject 
(see Allen, 2017, for further notes on how this is calculated). 
  In order to compare the allocation of teacher quality across schools we construct a deprivation 
measure for each school using the proportion of pupils who qualify for free school meals (for a 
discussion of the use of FSM as a measure of deprivation, see Hobbs and Vignoles (2010)). Schools 
are then split into five equally sized groups based on this metric, with quintile 1 containing the 20% of 
schools with the least deprived intakes and quintile 5 containing the 20% of schools with the most 
deprived intakes. 
 
Findings 
Figure 1 shows the incidence of unqualified, low experience and high experience teachers, broken 
down by primary and secondary school phase. The proportion of teachers who are not qualified in 
primary schools with the highest concentration of FSM pupils is 4%, while in schools with the least 
deprived intake the figure is 2%. The gradient is similar for secondary, where schools with the least 
deprived intake have 5% unqualified teachers and those with the most deprived intakes have 9%. The 
least deprived schools also have more highly experienced teachers. The lowest deprivation primary 
schools have 12% of teachers with more than ten years of experience while the most deprived schools 
have just 7%. Among secondary schools the figures are 12% and 8% respectively. The gradients are 
present across primary and secondary school phases, meaning that the finding of unequal allocation 
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does not depend on a point of interpretation about whether the existing literature shows effects at 
secondary stage. 
 
<Figure 1 about Here> 
 
 
Inequalities in access to teacher quality are also visible when looking at whether teachers 
have a degree in the subject they are teaching. Figure 2 shows whether Key Stage 3 (KS3) teachers 
(those working with lower secondary schools pupils between 11 and 14 years of age) have an 
academic degree in the subject they are teaching across the five deprivation quintiles. Figure 3 shows 
the same for KS4 teachers (working with secondary school pupils aged 14 to 16). The results show a 
clear division between arts and science subjects. In both Key Stages, English, History, Geography and 
Modern Foreign Languages teachers are just as likely to have an appropriate degree across the 
deprivation quintiles. However, for Maths and Science subjects a clear gradient emerges, with more 
deprived schools much more likely to have teachers with inappropriate qualifications. For maths, 
which is our primary indicator of interest, the gap between the least and most deprived quintiles is 10 
percentage points. Other subjects also have substantial gaps: 14 percentage points for KS4 Chemistry 
and 22 percentage points for Physics. It is interesting to note that the subjects with the biggest gaps 
are those for which teacher shortages are the most severe (NAO, 2016). This suggests that schools 
struggling to recruit are more likely to have to settle for teachers who have not studied the subject at 
degree level. 
 
<Figure 2 about Here> 
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<Figure 3 about Here> 
 
 
 In summary, across all three of our indicators disadvantaged pupils are disproportionately 
likely to get lower quality teachers. Focusing for simplicity on secondary: the odds of pupils in the 
most deprived quintile of schools getting an unqualified teacher are 88% higher than those in the least 
deprived quintile; the odds of pupils in the most deprived quintile getting a novice teacher are 32% 
higher than those in the least deprived quintile; and the odds of those in the most deprived quintile 
getting an out of subject teacher are 49% higher than those in the least deprived quintile. Given the 
importance of teacher quality for child attainment and later earnings, these inequalities could well 
have materially important effects on life chances and later income inequalities. Of course it may be 
the case that, within schools, the most disadvantaged pupils are given access to the best quality 
teachers, mitigating the effects of these between schools allocation patterns. Before moving on to 
7 
 
discuss such within school allocation however, we first discuss why these between-school inequalities 
occur.   
Explaining unequal allocation of teaching quality between schools 
Any explanation of these teacher allocation patterns must first account for the reasons that inexperienced, 
unqualified or out-of-subject teachers join particular schools. Many early-career teachers find positions in schools 
serving disadvantaged intakes (Allen et al., 2012). In part, this likely reflects the preferences of teachers. For 
example, a recent survey found that the reason most frequently cited by early-career teacher’s for joining the 
profession was “making a difference to pupils lives”, which was identified as a “very important” reason by 60% of 
respondents, with a further 45% citing the “opportunity to make a difference to society” as being very important 
(Menzies et al. 2013). This demand-side effect is reinforced on the supply side by the higher number of vacancies 
available in schools with more disadvantaged pupils. Our data show that annual turnover (defined as the proportion 
of teachers who are working in a school in year t but are no longer working there in year t+1) in schools in the most 
deprived quintile is 58% higher than those in the least deprived quintile. This turnover creates vacancies which 
means that there are plenty of job opportunities in these schools for early-career teachers. Surveys of head teachers 
have shown that schools facing many vacancies tend to react by lowering recruitment standards (Smithers and 
Robinson, 2000) which may also explain why head teachers are more likely to appoint out-of-subject teachers 
(Figure 3). Early-career (inexperienced, pre-qualification) teachers are therefore both willing to work in 
disadvantaged schools and, along with out-of-subject teachers, find it easier to get work in them. Taken together, 
this evidence provides an explanation for the concentration of low quality teachers entering disadvantaged schools. 
The flip side of explaining teacher allocation is understanding why teachers leave certain schools. The 
survey by Menzies et al. (2013) also asked teachers about their motivations for staying in the profession. Although 
“changing pupils’ lives” remained an important reason, the most frequently cited reason for staying is “Being good 
at it” (84%). This survey evidence is corroborated by a range of controlled studies showing that teachers are more 
likely to quit if they feel they are not becoming good teachers (Klassen and Chui, 2011; Johnson and Birkeland, 
2003; McNatt and Judge, 2008). A number of studies (for a review, see Simon and Johnson, 2013) have shown 
that schools with disadvantaged intakes are generally less supportive working environments for teachers. We 
investigate whether this greater workforce instability can be explained by local labour market conditions and 
teacher characteristics alone, or whether schools with disadvantaged intakes have some additional turnover that 
might signal more difficult teaching environments. We do this by using four logistic regressions to model the 
chances that a teacher leaves their school in summer 2013, adding explanatory variables in turn. The first estimates 
the odds of leaving based school FSM quintile alone. The second adds to this a vector of teacher individual 
characteristics: age, gender, ethnic minority status, qualified status, experience. The third also adds a vector of 
region dummies to account for the wider teacher labour market conditions in that region. Finally, we replace the 
regional dummies with a random effect that accounts for underlying teacher labour market conditions at the more 
localised area of a parliamentary constituency. The full model is set out in the Appendix. 
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Figure 4 shows that in primary schools, when no control variables are used in the model, the odds of a teacher 
leaving a school are 20% higher in the most deprived than in the least deprived quintile of schools. Expressed as 
turnover rates, this equates to 17% in the least deprived schools and 21% in the most deprived schools. Controlling 
first for a set of teacher characteristics and then for the region and parliamentary constituency in which the school is 
located does not attenuate the relationship between disadvantage and turnover. At secondary level (Figure 5) the 
relationship is even stronger. When controls are used in the model, the odds of a teacher leaving a school are 60% 
higher in the most deprived than in the least deprived quintile of schools. Expressed as turnover rates, this equates 
to 16% in the least deprived schools and 23% in the most deprived schools. Differences in the odds of teachers 
leaving are even more pronounced if we compare schools with different levels of deprivation that are located in the 
same local area (i.e. parliamentary constituency). Teach First deliberately places inexperienced teachers in more 
deprived schools and has a low retention rate, meaning it will contribute to these inequalities. However Teacher 
First is only responsible for around one-sixth of the observed gradient, because it only accounts for a small 
proportion of initial teacher training (Allen et al., 2016). This sort of high turnover, even after accounting for 
teacher characteristics and school location, can further damage social support networks in schools. This can make it 
hard for more deprived schools to provide adequate support for new teachers, which can further perpetuate the 
cycle of high turnover (Feng, 2010).  
 
<Figure 4 about Here> 
 
<Figure 5 about Here> 
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The Allocation of Teacher Quality Within Schools 
Data and Method 
The SWC does not allow us to assess the distribution of teacher quality within schools because the 
only information it provides on teaching assignments is the subject and year groups that are taught. 
For the within-school analysis we therefore use data from the Teaching and Learning International 
Survey (TALIS) 2013. TALIS was first conducted in 2008 and occurs every five years. In 2013, data 
were collected from 34 different countries or regions around the world. Within each country at least 
200 schools were randomly sampled, with 20 KS3 teachers from each school randomly selected to 
respond to the survey. In 2013 2,496 teachers from 154 schools in England responded, representing a 
school response rate of 75.1% and a teacher response rate of 83.4% (Micklewright, 2014).  
TALIS collects information on all aspects of teachers and their working lives including their 
background, the professional development available to them, feedback, pedagogy and school climate. 
Crucially for our purposes, TALIS asks respondents to provide information about a specific “target 
class”, which is defined as the class they were teaching at 11am last Tuesday (or the first subsequent 
KS3 class). Clearly, this is only one of many classes that the responding teacher will work with. But 
there are two ways in which we can be confident that it is representative. First, the Tuesday 11am 
criteria is arbitrary and therefore the class that a teacher works with at that time is plausibly 
exogenous to the make-up of that class. Some sampled teachers will have a target class that is more 
disadvantaged than their average class and some sampled teachers will have a target class that is less 
disadvantaged than their average class. Across the 2,496 teachers that responded however, these 
differences should balance each other out. Second, the respondents are asked whether the target class 
is representative of all the classes they teach. We therefore report robustness tests in which we check 
whether the results hold for the sub-group of teachers who say their target class is representative.  
Ideally, we would use objective measures of pupil deprivation as in the between-school 
analysis. Unfortunately, such a measure is not available in the TALIS dataset. However, teachers are 
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asked to estimate the proportion of pupils in their target class who qualify for free school meals and 
record the answer on the following scale: 0%; 1-10%; 11-30%; 31-60%; more than 60%. For this 
stage of the analysis we therefore use ordered logit regression to assess whether the estimated 
proportion of disadvantaged pupils in a classroom is related to each of our indicators of teacher 
effectiveness in turn. Coefficients are reported as odds ratios, so a coefficient of 1.2 (0.8) means a one 
unit increase in our indictors of teacher effectiveness correspond to a 20% increase (decrease) in the 
odds of the target class being one deprivation category higher. We control for the school in which the 
teacher works, so that we are comparing within schools, but we do not control for other factors 
because we are checking for an association (whether disadvantaged kids are more likely to experience 
ineffective teachers) rather than trying to model the determinants of an outcome. If the confidence 
interval includes an odds ratio of 1 then our results are compatible with there being no association at 
the 95% confidence level. This is effectively equivalent to a t-test, but using regression allows us to 
account for the complex survey design used in the TALIS questionnaire in order to correctly estimate 
the standard errors. This is done using the REPEST programme in STATA (Avvisati and Keslair, 
2015).  
 
Findings 
Our within-school analysis shows less consistent evidence of inequality in access to teacher quality. 
The relationship between whether a teacher is qualified and how disadvantaged their class is does not 
reach statistical significance at conventional levels. Years of experience shows an association, 
statistically significant at the 99% confidence level, and this is robust to a narrowing of the sample to 
teachers who reported their target class being representative of their other classes. Each additional 
year of experience is associated with a 2% decrease in the odds of having a target class falling in a 
higher deprivation category, increasing to 3% amongst teachers who report their target class being 
representative. Predictive margins show that the probability a teacher with mean characteristics and 
one year of experience has a target class with less than 10% of disadvantaged pupils is 43.9%, 
whereas for a teacher with ten years of experience, the probability is 48.6%. Our third indicator of 
teacher quality - subject specialism - also fails to reach statistical significance at conventional levels. 
In results not shown for space reasons, we also establish that there is no association when look 
specifically at maths and science teachers. In summary, we find some evidence that less less effective 
teachers are given classes with more disadvantaged pupils, although this is limited to our experience 
indicator.  
 
<Table 1 about Here> 
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Explaining unequal allocation of teaching quality between schools 
Discussion of the mechanisms underpinning teacher allocation can help shed light on these findings. Early 
qualitative research in this area (Finley, 1984; Monk, 1987) suggested that more experienced teachers use their 
influence in the school to acquire desirable class allocations. More recently, controlled quantitative studies in the 
US have shown that teachers who hold leadership positions in the school (Kalogrides et al., 2012) and have more 
years of experience in a particular school (Grissom et al., 2015) are allocated to less challenging classes. Grissom et 
al. (2015, p2) argue that teacher who have worked “within the system” for longer accrue “social and organisational 
capital, including respect from school leaders and other actors, understanding of school organisational processes 
and relationships within the school community” which allow them to influence “decisions about how students are 
assigned to teachers”. These findings provides a direct link between teacher experience and teacher assignment.  
We can investigate this in our data by modelling how disadvantaged a teacher’s target class is based on 
teacher and school characteristics. In Model 3 we regress the number of years a teacher has spent at their current 
school on how disadvantaged their target class is, controlling for school level factors (including proportion of FSM 
pupils in the school as a whole). We find that number of years since joining the school is associated with a 2% 
reduction in the odds of having a more disadvantaged class, significant at the 99% level. Again, this effect will 
compound over a multiple unit change in the predictor variable. In Model 4 we add individual level controls, 
including how many years of experience a teacher has in total. This leaves the coefficient almost unchanged but 
expands the standard error, which means the coefficient is no longer statistically significant. In Model 5 we restrict 
our sample to those teacher who said their target class was representative of their other classes, which reduces our 
sample size by around a third. The coefficient on Model 5 remains virtually unchanged but the standard errors 
expands further and the result is no longer statistically significant at conventional levels. Despite the failure of this 
robustness check, this evidence is broadly consistent with the findings from Grissom et al. (2015) that teachers who 
have spent longer in a school are better able to influence their allocation to less disadvantaged classrooms. 
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<Table 2 about Here> 
 
 It is also possible that the allocation of less experienced teachers to more deprived classes 
reflects a strategic choice on the part of school leaders. In 2013, and to some extent now, schools were 
being held accountable for the proportion of pupils who achieve five or more A*-C grades. Deprived 
pupils also tend to be low attaining and many of the most deprived will therefore not be within range 
of the C/D borderline. Schools therefore face less incentive to allocate experienced teachers to these 
classes and this may influence teacher allocation (Boyd et al., 2008).  
Policy Implications 
The policy imperative to do something about inequalities in the allocation of teachers to 
schools is particularly pressing at present. The current government is looking for ways to address 
teacher shortages, including expanding opportunities for teachers to train on the job and achieve 
qualified teacher status without necessarily completing an academic degree (Peacock, 2017). 
Disadvantaged schools facing staffing shortages may therefore find themselves making even greater 
use of non-specialist or unqualified teachers. 
There are several policy options for changing the allocation of teachers between schools. One 
is to incentivise high-quality teachers to work in schools with more disadvantaged pupils. The 
Government are trying various approaches to this, including the recently announced student loan 
forgiveness for new teachers who teach in certain parts of the country (Schools Week, 2017). Figures 
6 and 7 show how teacher pay varies by the deprivation level of a school. On average, teachers 
working at schools with more disadvantaged pupils are paid less. But this is because they tend to be 
less experienced. In order to disentangle these effects we regress teacher pay on deprivation level of 
the school. Then in regression 2 we add individual teacher characteristics, including experience, to 
show how otherwise identical teachers are paid across different levels of school deprivation. Next, we 
add regional dummies to take account of local labour market pay conditions. Finally, we replace the 
regional dummies with parliamentary constituency random effects so that we are identifying how pay 
varies by school deprivation for similarly experienced and qualified teachers working in nearby 
schools. 
The results show that if a given primary teacher moved from a local school in the lowest to a 
school in the highest deprivation quintile they could expect to achieve a pay rise of around £530 per 
annum. A secondary teacher making the same move would currently gain £1,289 per annum. These 
incentives may already be supressing inequalities in teacher allocation. Indeed, an evaluation of a 
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comparable annual retention bonus implemented in North Carolina found that it reduced turnover 
among targeted teachers by around 14% (Clotfelter et al., 2008). Further research is required to 
understand how much larger incentives in England would need to be to eliminate or reverse existing 
inequalities. 
 
<Figure 8 about Here> 
 
<Figure 9 about Here> 
 
A second option for equalising between-school allocation is to improve working conditions 
for teachers, since this has been repeatedly linked with retention in controlled quantitative studies 
(Johnson et al., 2012; Sims, 2017). The Job Demands Resources (JDR) model (Demerouti et al., 
2001) provides a useful framework for understanding the mechanism by which working conditions 
affect turnover. It states that when the demands placed on employees exceed the resources available to 
them (defined as anything that helps achieve their goals) over a sustained period, people become 
exhausted, disengage from their work and eventually leave. The model has been shown to empirically 
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explain burnout and turnover across a range of professional settings, including teaching (Crawford et 
al., 2010; Hakanen et al., 2006). Perhaps the most promising way of providing additional resources 
(support) to young teachers is by providing high quality mentoring, which has been shown to reduce 
turnover in carefully controlled evaluations (Smith and Ingersoll, 2004; Rockoff, 2008). In terms of 
reducing demands on teachers, research shows that giving them simple, stable work assignments, 
rather than teaching multiple subjects or shifting year groups also reduces turnover (Donaldson and 
Johnson, 2010; Ost and Schiman, 2015). Ofsted (2017) have recently made a series of announcements 
which suggest they will pay closer attention to teacher turnover and working conditions when they 
inspect schools. 
Changing the allocation of teachers within schools is perhaps more challenging, since this is 
determined by subtle political processes inside schools. One option is to incentivise schools to raise 
the academic achievement of more disadvantaged groups through the introduction of additional 
performance metrics for publication in school performance tables or for use by the school 
inspectorate. Evidence from the US suggests that performance metrics are able to influence the 
allocation of teachers within schools in this way (Boyd et al., 2008). Any such metrics would however 
require careful design in order to avoid unintended consequences. 
  
Conclusion 
We find clear, consistent evidence of an inequitable allocation of teacher quality between schools. 
This likely reflects both the preferences of inexperienced teachers to work in schools with disadvantaged intakes 
and, on the flip side, a greater supply of vacant positions in these schools, due to poor working conditions 
damaging staff turnover. This creates a cycle of entry and exit which has the effect of holding down 
average experience, pushing up turnover and creating recruitment pressures for schools which often 
leads to them hiring teachers with mismatched qualifications. Within schools we also find some 
evidence of inequitable allocation of more experienced teachers. This likely reflects the fact that more 
experienced teachers tend to have been in their current school for longer than their less experienced 
peers, which allows them to influence their allocation to less disadvantaged classrooms. Improving 
working conditions within disadvantaged school is likely to be a low cost way of disrupting the cycle 
of hiring, quits and further hiring of low quality teachers that is holding down average teacher quality 
in schools with disadvantaged intakes. 
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Appendix 
 
In Figure 4 and Figure 5, we model the probability that a teacher (i) leaves their school (j) at 
the end of the 2012/13 academic year using a series of logistic regressions with the overall 
form: 
 
𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑃𝑟(𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑣𝑒)
1− 𝑃𝑟(𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑣𝑒)
)
𝑖𝑗
=  𝛽0 +  𝛽1. 𝐹𝑆𝑀𝑗 +  𝛽2. 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑗 +  𝛽3. 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑗 +  𝜀𝑖𝑗          
Where:  
𝑃𝑟(𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑣𝑒) = The probability of leaving a school at the end of the year 
𝐹𝑆𝑀 = A categorical variable ranging from one (schools in the lowest quintile of pupils with 
free school meals status) to five (the highest quintile). 
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𝐷𝑒𝑚 = A vector of individual teacher characteristics: age in years, a dummy indicting female 
gender, a dummy indicating ethnic minority status, a dummy indicating qualified teacher status, 
and number of years since qualification. 
𝑅𝑒𝑔 = A vector of regional dummies that are included as fixed effect dummies. In the right 
hand panel of Figure 4 and Figure 5, we replace this vector of region dummies with a larger 
number of parliamentary constituency indicators (PCReg), which we model as a random effect: 
𝑃𝐶𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑗 ~ 𝑁(0 , 𝜎𝑃𝐶𝑅𝑒𝑔
2 )      ,    𝜀𝑖𝑗 ~ 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜀
2 )         
 
